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In this paper we estimate the degree of real wage flexibility in 19 EU countries
1 
in a wage Phillips curve panel framework. We find evidence for a reaction of 
wage growth to unemployment and productivity growth. However, due to 
unemployment persistence, over time the real wage response weakens 
substantially. Our results suggest that the degree of real wage flexibility tends 
to be larger in the central and eastern European (CEE) countries than in the 
euro area; weaker in downturns than during upswings. Moreover, there exists 
an inflation threshold, below which real wage flexibility seems to decrease. 
Finally, we find that part of the heterogeneity in real wage flexibility and 
unemployment might be related to differences in the wage bargaining 
institutions and more specifically the extent of labour market regulation in 
different country groups within the EU. 
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1 The countries covered in this paper are the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,  
Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Ireland 
and Greece.  5
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The key objective of our paper is to measure the degree of real wage flexibility in 19 EU 
countries and to determine how it varies depending on factors such as the cyclical position of an 
a monetary union, where independent monetary and exchange rate policy is not available, real wage 
flexibility is a crucial adjustment channel to asymmetric shocks, especially if cross-border labour 
mobility and fiscal flexibility is limited. In addition, sufficient real wage flexibility is also desirable 
in the CEE countries during their convergence process, in particular to cope with external shocks 
and structural adjustments that may temporarily cause a decrease in aggregate demand.  
Our estimation strategy is conducted in a panel framework, accounting for unobserved 
country-specific factors. Real wage flexibility is measured in a broad manner, both in terms of the 
models take into consideration not only the immediate, but also the lagged effect of these factors. 
With respect to unemployment, the baseline specification finds evidence of real wage flexibility on 
the aggregate EU level, as wage growth responds to contemporaneous cyclical unemployment. 
However, flexibility is limited by a hysteresis effect as it partially reverses the initial response, 
which is an often documented phenomenon in EU countries. Real wages are also shown to adjust to 
past values of productivity growth.  
  Turning to the factors that might cause heterogeneity in real wage flexibility, our 
specifications reveal that real wage flexibility tend to be weaker during downturns of the business 
cycle (when it is most needed) than during upturns (largely in line with the literature). More 
specifically, when unemployment is below the “equilibrium” (NAIRU) unemployment level (i.e. 
during an upswing in the business cycle), real wage flexibility is relatively high. In contrast, if 
unemployment is above the NAIRU level, (i.e. during downturns) there is a clear hysteresis effect, 
which eliminates in two quarters most of the initial response of real wages to unemployment.  
 Real wage flexibility appears to be somewhat higher in the CEE countries than in the euro 
area both with respect to the response to unemployment and to productivity. This difference is likely 
related to differences in labour market institutions in general and in wage bargaining institutions in 
particular. 
Looking in more detail at the role of institutional differences on real wage flexibility we 
apply the hierarchical cluster analysis of Du Caju et al. (2008) distinguishing three broad types of 
countries with respect to labour market institutions: broadly regulated, regulated and deregulated. 
With respect to unemployment, the least flexible group is the middle one with “broadly regulated” 
labour markets, since the results point at substantial hysteresis effects. The regulated group also 
exhibits hysteresis effect, although it does not eliminate all of the wage response. The deregulated 
economy labour market institutions or the level of inflation. The economic literature suggests that in 
response of real wages to cyclical unemployment as well as to productivity growth. In addition, the 6
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economies seem to exhibit the largest degree of real wage flexibility. The similarity between the 
regulated and deregulated groups, which are both more flexible than the middle group, is in line 
with the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis which postulates a hump-shaped relationship between the 
level of coordination in the wage negotiations and the degree of real wage moderation. The picture 
is somewhat different as regards the response of real wages to productivity growth: the response is 
clearly largest in the deregulated group, where company level bargaining is dominant. The impact in 
the middle, broadly regulated groupis substantially lower, and the regulated group appears to be the 
least flexible.  
Finally our panel data analysis reveals that an inflation threshold may exist, below which 
low inflation may decrease real wage flexibility. The differential response of real wage flexibility to 
inflation seems to confirm the evidence on the presence of nominal downward wage rigidity in the 
EU countries.  
Overall our results suggest that labour market adjustment mechanisms in the EU countries 
might be impaired in particular in downturns and during low inflation periods. This implies that in 
the euro area countries and also in those CEE countries outside the euro area that successfully enter 
a low inflation period in their convergence process have to pay particular attention that their policies 
do not hamper real wage flexibility. As regards the role of wage bargaining institutions, our results 
do not suggest that the way to go forward is necessarily to move towards decentralisation. On the 
contrary, it appears that a high degree of centralisation also has some benefits. 
The results of this paper are subject to a number of caveats (e.g. as regards the measurement 
of unemployment and wages as a result of a relatively large gray economy in some of the countries), 
















The objective of the paper is to estimate the degree of real wage flexibility in EU Member 
unemployment and productivity. While the EU countries in our sample are at very different levels 
of economic development, labour market flexibility is an extremely important structural factor for 
all of them. In a monetary union, where independent monetary and exchange rate policy is not 
available, real wage flexibility is a crucial adjustment channel to asymmetric shocks, especially if 
cross-border labour mobility and fiscal flexibility is limited
2. In addition, sufficient real wage 
flexibility is also desirable in the CEE countries during their convergence process, in particular to 
cope with external shocks and structural adjustments that may temporarily cause a decrease in 
aggregate demand. Those economies, where a flexible downward adjustment of real wages is 
possible, tend to have a better chance to withstand adverse economic shocks with lower adjustment 
costs (e.g. unemployment) than economies that are characterised by rigid real wages.  
In our paper we approach the issue of real wage flexibility from a broad perspective looking 
at a panel of 19 EU countries. In addition to assessing aggregate real wage flexibility, we examine 
various heterogeneities in the relationship between real wages and real variables. For instance, we 
evaluate the impact of the economic cycle on real wage flexibility looking at the differences of the 
impact of real variables on real wage growth in up- and downturns of the cycle (measured by the 
level of unemployment compared to the NAIRU level.) In addition, we assess the difference 
between real wage flexibility in the CEE countries (most of which are still outside the euro area) 
and nine ”old” euro area countries.
3 Moreover, we examine whether real wage flexibility differs 
depending on the level of inflation. Finally, we obtain estimates on the impact of a broad indicator 
of the degree of regulation of wage bargaining institutions on real wage flexibility. 
  An important caveat of our analysis is the fact that besides real wage adjustment, the 
adjustment in the labour markets can take many other forms (e.g. migration, changes in labour force 
real wages may react less then they would otherwise. A further complication is the existence of 
relatively extensive grey economy in some of the countries: it may influence the behaviour of 
wages, distort the official wage figures and might itself represent an alternative labour market 
                                                 
2 See for example Chapter 4 in European Commission (2003): European Economy No. 6/2003; The EU 
Economy: 2003 Review 
3 Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and Greece. 
states, where real wage flexibility is defined through the responsiveness of real wages to shocks in 
participation and part time arrangements or other factors). In the presence of these other mechanisms,  8
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4. In some countries, the share of the grey economy might be substantial: for 
2003, among CEE countries, it is estimated at 18% for Hungary and almost 30% for Bulgaria 
(Tonin, 2004).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review, 
including an overview of the labour market institutions of the examined EU countries. Section 3 
continues with a discussion of the estimation strategy and the data used, and section 4 with the 
presentation and interpretation of the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. Previous work on real wage flexibility in the EU 
2.1. The factors behind real wage heterogeneity 
In principle, there are two major approaches measuring real wage flexibility: the wage 
curve and the Phillips curve approach. While the wage curve approach (e.g. Blanchflower 2001) 
mainly uses microeconomic data ( large datasets of individual data), the Phillips curve approach 
(e.g. Blanchard and Katz 1999) measures aggregate wage flexibility relying on macroeconomic data 
(  aggregate wages, inflation, unemployment). The conceptual difference between the two 
approaches is that the wage curve approach relates the level of wages to the unemployment level 
and therefore represents an equilibrium concept, while the wage Phillips curve relates wage growth 
to the unemployment level and hence reflects an adjustment process towards equilibrium. 
Consequently, real wage flexibility is also defined differently: the wage curve approach implies that 
under higher unemployment, the wage level should be lower, while the Phillips curve approach 
argues that wages should keep decreasing. Given the availability only of macroeconomic data, we 
opt for the Phillips curve approach. 
We are interested in comparing real wage flexibility across countries and country groups in 
a broad sense, taking into account its multi-dimensional nature. Hence, we conceptualize real wage 
flexibility in a broad way, using two indicators. In the first place, similarly to Babetskii (2006), we 
assume that real wage flexibility is defined through a significant negative link between 
unemployment and wage growth. Conversely, real wage rigidity implies either an absence of such 
effect, or a considerably retarded one. As a second indicator of real wage flexibility, we asses the 
responsiveness of wages to changes in productivity, which has attracted substantially less empirical 
research than the link with unemployment. For each of these indicators, we compare not only the 
coefficient sizes, but also the speed and lag structure of the response: as Kittel (2001) argues, it is 
important to consider not only the differences in the flexibility outcomes, but also in the way these 
outcomes have been achieved. The timeliness of the wage response to economic developments is 
                                                 
4 For instance, in the case of an aggregate demand shock employers are more likely to fire first the informal 
part of the labour force and to cut wages in the part of the labour force not protected by the labour protection 
regulations of the formal economy.  9
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also relevant, since if it is strongly delayed, then the adjustment might not be optimal any longer in 
the presence of new shocks.  
The empirical literature has found some evidence of real wage flexibility in the EU 
economies, with substantial heterogeneity across countries (e.g. Arpaia and Pichelmann, 2007, 
Babetskii 2006, etc.). However, the literature is often inconclusive about the nature of the factors 
behind country heterogeneity and the magnitude of their impact. Comparison with existing studies 
is often hindered by differences in model specifications, time periods and different sets of 
dependent and control variables. In particular, in many cases only contemporaneous variables and 
not lag structures are considered, hence the estimation does not capture the dynamic nature of the 
wage response.  
In order to determine the country groups, we consider four factors which we expect to have 
an impact on real wage flexibility: the cyclical position of the economy, proxied by the sign of the 
gap between cyclical unemployment and NAIRU, the CEE countries vs. euro area division, the 
labour market institutions and the level of inflation. For each of the factors, there is a body of 
previous research which provides some expectations about the way they would affect real wage 
adjustment.  
About the dependence of real wage flexibility on the phase of the cycle, the available 
evidence suggests that it is substantially higher in downturns than in upswings. For instance, Woitek 
(2004) finds that the phase of the business cycle of the economy matters for the degree of real wage 
flexibility. Messina et al. (2009) report a positive link between the cyclicality of wages (e.g. the 
degree to which they react to output) and the level of employment, which would in turn suggest a 
negative link between their cyclicality and the unemployment level. Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) 
also document asymmetric response of wages in upswing and downturn. 
As for the comparison between CEE countries and the euro area, there are only a few recent 
studies which tackle this issue. The results of Babetskii (2006), which are based on macroeconomic 
data, do not seem to support the argument that the degree of wage adjustment is higher in the 
three EMU members selected than in the CEE countries. Van Poeck (2007) finds, however, that 
wages in the four selected CEE countries are more responsive to unemployment than in most EU 
countries. His finding is associated with differences in labour market institutions, showing that on 
average institutions are more flexible in the 4 CEE countries in their sample than in the 9 other EU 
As regards the impact of labour market institutions, some papers specifically concentrate on 
the empirical evaluation of the role of institutions on wage dynamics. Much of the empirical 
literature concentrates on the centralization of wage bargaining, but it is generally inconclusive 
about its effect on economic outcomes (Du Caju et al., 2008). Some authors find supportive 
evidence for the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis, which postulates a hump-shaped relationship between 
countries (mainly euro area) except for the active labour market policies and taxation of wages.  10
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the level of coordination in the wage negotiations and the degree of real wage moderation. 
According to the hypothesis, centralized bargaining produces moderate results because of 
internalizing the negative effects of excessive wage growth on the entire economy, and the company 
level bargaining – since wage growth is limited by competitive forces (Calmfors 1994).
 Alesina and Perotti (1997) divide countries into three broad institutional groups, based on the
 level of wage bargaining, and find support for the hump-shaped relationship between this 
indicator and wages. Nunziata (2005) also suggests that wage bargaining institutions play a major 
role in influencing wage dynamics, however he suggests that wage growth moderates with higher 
level of coordination: while there is no significant effect in countries where coordination remained 
stable over the period, the increasing level of wage bargaining coordination in the 1990s has been 
particularly relevant for moderating labour costs in Ireland, France and Italy.  
Kittel (2001), considering both level of wage bargaining and type of coordination, finds that 
countries with uncoordinated labour markets tend to respond less flexibly to shocks than those that 
rely on some kind of coordination, especially pattern setting and peak-level coordination. 
Apart from the level of coordination, another factor identified in the literature is union 
density and coverage, and a negative relationship has been established between union density and 
flexibility  (e.g. Clar et al. (2007), using a meta-analysis). 
The last factor causing heterogeneity in wage flexibility considered is the inflation level. 
It leads to heterogeneous behaviour of real wages due to the presence of downward nominal wage 
rigidity (Akerlof et al. 1996, Groschen and Schweitzer 1999). When wages are nominally 
downward rigid due to a nominal wage floor and inflation is close to zero, real wage flexibility 
might be limited as firms resort to reducing employment rather than paying real wage above 
equilibrium (Akerlof et al. 1996). Therefore, moderate inflation levels increase real wage flexibility 
as they facilitate real wage cuts (e.g. Hyslop, 1997). Empirically, both micro and macro studies have 
provided supporting evidence. Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) demonstrate on micro data that 
inflation in a certain low range “adds grease” to the wheels of the labour market, helping to relax 
real wage rigidities. However, as too high inflation can also be harmful (e.g it can increase the 
likelihood of the introduction of wage indexation mechanism), the net benefits of inflation seem to 
peak at a CPI inflation rate around 2.5%. On the macro level, Hyslop et al. (1996) document 
low-inflation regime. Finally, Babetskii (2006) argues that the decrease in real wage flexibility in 
selected EU countries over the review period, or the absence of such, could be at least partially 
linked to a decline in inflation. One of the areas where our paper intends to contribute to the 
empirical literature is conducting a formal search for an inflation threshold causing different 
real wage flexibility.  
through a Philips-curve methodology that real wages adjust better in a high-inflation than in a11
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2.2. Labour market institutions
Given the central role of labour market institutions in our empirical investigation, we briefly 
review the labour market institutions of the countries in our sample before proceeding with 
specification issues.  
For classifying countries by institutions, we generally follow Du Caju et al. (2008). 
However, while their results are based on the questionnaire of the Eurosystem's Wage Dynamics 
Network sent out in 2006, we also use data from a second round of the questionnaire sent out by the 
Romania and Slovakia), broadening the geographical scope of the analysis (see Table A2 in the 
appendix). 
The cluster analysis conducted on wage setting institutions in Caju et al. (2008) identifies 
three groups of countries using a set of twelve indicators of labour market institutions
5. The first 
group with a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining includes the majority of euro area 
countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal and Sweden). It can be characterised by the existence of extension procedures and a high 
level of collective agreement coverage, a dominance of sectoral (and to a lesser extent firm level) 
wage bargaining and the general absence of coordination except through minimum wages (or trend 
setting sectors).  
The second group (Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain) exhibits 
the same general wage setting characteristics of the previous group, but with bigger importance of 
indexation, intersectoral agreements and the role of government.  
Finally, the third group includes countries where the wage bargaining system is largely 
deregulated (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Poland, the UK and the US). 
Most of the other Central and Eastern European EU countries are also in this group (Table A2), 
including the four countries we add to the sample. They have several characteristics which may 
support wage flexibility like the limited role played by trade unions, as suggested by measures like 
trade union density (defined as the percentage of workers who are members of a trade union) and 
collective bargaining coverage (measured by the share of all workers who are covered by some sort 
of collective agreement). Moreover, in most of these countries company level bargaining dominate 
and hence the bargaining process is highly decentralised.
                                                 
5 Among these are: trade union density, coverage of collective agreements, level of wage bargaining, type of 
coordination, government involvement, average duration of wage agreements, minimum wage, presence and 
type of indexation mechanisms. 
ECB in 2008, that allows us to add institutional data on four further CEE countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, 12
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3. Empirical analysis on real wage flexibility in the EU 
3.1. General economic considerations
The empirical specification is based on the Blanchard and Katz (1999) bargaining adjusted 
Phillips curve model, where the real wage is set depending on the union’s reservation wage, the 
level of productivity and the prevailing level of unemployment. The model’s testable equation 
relates the change in nominal wages to the unemployment level, expected inflation and the change 
in productivity:  
() t t t t t t t t t
e
t t w u y y p w p p c w w ε β β β β β + Δ + + Δ + − − − − + = − − − − − − − 1 5 4 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 ) (  (1) 
In the above equation, pt is the price level (and p
e the expected price level), ¨yt represents 
the change in productivity level, ut the unemployment rate and wt the level of nominal wages (all 
variables except unemployment are in logs). The term () 1 1 1 − − − − − t t t y p w  represents an error 
correction term (ECT), which is derived from a long-run relationship between wages, prices and 
trend productivity.  
We adopt a distributed lag structure similarly to Wulfsberg (1997) and Kittel (2001), where 
the independent variables influence wage growth through their current and lagged values. There are 
two important reasons for this choice. First, as we are dealing with relatively high-frequency (e.g. 
quarterly) data, we are likely to observe slow adjustment of the variables to shocks in the labour 
market, taking longer than one quarter. Second, the lag structure reflects the speed of adjustment of 
real wages to changes in the exogenous factors and hence contains important information on the 
timing and structure of the wage response. The results of the empirical analysis (Section 4) reveal 
that the lag structure does indeed provide important information and that we observe significant 
lagged values of all external factors, which is evidence of deterred adjustment. In particular, 
investigating the significance and the signs of the lagged unemployment terms allows for detecting 
potential hysteresis or persistence effects.  
After including the lag structure, the Phillips curve takes the following form: 
() () () t t t i t t t w ECT u L y L p L c w ε δ θ γ β α + Δ + + + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − 1 1                  (3) 
 
maximum lag length used in the regressions is determined empirically, starting from a maximum of 
four lags for all variables.  
The dependent variable is the change in nominal wages, which is calculated as logarithmic 
quarter-on-quarter difference of the seasonally adjusted nominal average wage for the total 
economy.  A number of studies based on the wage bargaining model (Blanchard and Katz 1999, 
Wulfsberg 1997, Kittel 2001) consider routinely nominal wages as dependent variable since 
In equation (3), L is the lag operator and Į( ),  ȕ( ) and Ȗ( ) are polynomials. The  L L L13
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nominal wages are the object of the wage bargaining. Coe (1995) argues that the alternative of real 
(deflated) wages on the left hand side would be equivalent to imposing a unitary coefficient of 
current inflation on wages, or full indexation of wages to prices. This is unlikely to be the case in 
general, and also not in our case, as wage indexation only plays a significant role in a handful of 
countries. 
The key independent variable in our analysis is the cyclical unemployment rate, which is a 
measure of the labour market conditions (e.g. Layard et al. 2006). It is calculated as a difference 
between the unemployment rate and NAIRU, where NAIRU is approximated by applying Hodrick-
Prescott filter to the unemployment rate series. The first dimension of real wage flexibility is 
represented by the coefficients and the lag structure of the structural unemployment variable Ȗi (e.g. 
Hyclak and Johnes 1995), given that inflation is controlled for through the inflation variable. 
Inflation captures the degree of adjustment of wages to inflation, or nominal wage 
flexibility. Our inflation variable refers to CPI inflation since sufficiently long series of other 
inflation measures (GDP deflator, PPI) are not available for all countries in the sample. CPI 
inflation is relevant for employees, who aim at preserving their purchasing power in the wage 
bargaining process and seek indexation for their wages according to the CPI, while employers are 
guided by the producer prices that reflect better changes in production costs. Since in a number of 
countries (see Du Caju et al. 2008) expected inflation is taken into account in the process of wage 
bargaining, a measure of inflationary expectations, based on Eurostat consumer price expectations 
survey, is added for those countries where this data is available (See Appendix A).   
The coefficient of productivity is the second measure of real wage flexibility we consider 
since it represents an additional path of real wage adjustment to macroeconomic shocks. The 
productivity measure we employ is value-added based: it is obtained by dividing whole economy 
real value added by total employment. For employers, productivity growth can be considered as the 
upper limit to acceptable wage increases. It is likely to play an especially important role in the CEE 
countries, since they have experienced substantial productivity improvements in the period 
considered.  
In order to capture the external influences on the economy, we include the trade-weighted 
nominal effective exchange rate. The sign of the expected effect on real wages is ambiguous. The 
depreciation of the domestic currency would lead to upward pressure on nominal wages in the wage 
negotiations as the cost of living increases due to the rising import prices (Radziwill and Walewski 
2006). However, as the CPI inflation term corrects for the increase in cost of living, the remaining 
effect depends on how fast and fully nominal wages can adjust to match this increase. Some works 
report negative response of real wage growth to the exchange rate (e.g. deceleration of wage growth 
under depreciation) - e.g. Goldberg and Tracy, 2003 for the USA.    14
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With all variables included, taking into account the panel setup and with lag structure 
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where 
e p Δ  is expected inflation,  i t neer − Δ   is the trade-weighted nominal effective exchange rate, 
and  μc denotes the country fixed effects. The c subscript refers to “country,” while the t subscript to 
“time” in the equation.   
3.2. Econometric considerations and data 
We opt for pooling together the observations for all countries using panel estimation. 
Within the panel, we implement different country or country-time groupings in order to identify 
systematic differences in wage flexibility caused by factors like the phase of the business cycle, 
labour market institutions, the level of inflation, etc. As a general strategy for investigating 
heterogeneities, we allow for differential slopes by including interaction terms of unemployment 
and productivity with sets of group dummies. This method partly relaxes the restrictions imposed by 
a completely homogenous model and allows for an individual pattern of adjustment in each group. 
Hence, if there are reasons for expecting heterogeneous behaviour, this technique could 
substantially reduce the potential bias introduced by the homogeneity restriction (Nunziata 2005 
refers to this technique as a “semi-pooled regression”). It has been extensively used in the literature 
for testing differences across regimes, including the effect of labour market institutions on wages 
and other macroeconomic variables (Alesina and Perotti 1997, Kittel 2001, Nunziata 2005).   
Our preferred estimation method is feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), which 
corrects for heteroskedasticity, as heteroskedasticity has been reported in previous works estimating 
Phillips curves in EU cross-country setting (e.g. Arpaia and Pichelmann, 2007). The regressions 
include country fixed effects to capture unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
7 
Our panel is dynamic (includes a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side), which 
in principle causes a bias in the coefficients estimated by OLS. However, it has been demonstrated 
that the size of the bias is of order O(1/T), and hence the bias is less relevant for longer panels 
(Nunziata 2005). Judson and Owen (2005) demonstrate that even with sample size T = 30, the bias 
is relatively small and the fixed effects estimator performs better than alternative estimators. As our 
                                                 
6 All changes are expressed in logarithmic differences. Trend productivity for the long-term relationship is 
obtained through applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter on the productivity series. 
7  Period fixed effects are not included as these are jointly insignificant. 15
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panel has a maximum time length of T = 82, we can expect the bias from estimating the panel with 
GLS to be relatively limited.  
Another issue regarding the econometric estimation is that the estimated regressions 
including unemployment or inflation might suffer from simultaneity bias, since wage growth is also 
likely to have an impact on the unemployment level and inflation. The problem is addressed by 
considering only lagged and not contemporaneous variables. As an exception, we allow for 
contemporaneous cyclical unemployment, which can theoretically be regarded as a lagged indicator 
of labour market conditions (see Coe, 1985)
8.  Finally a further important issue in the multi-country 
setup is the poolability across countries. We address this issue in subsection 4.6.  
The data used is quarterly data stemming mostly from Eurostat. The sample is unbalanced, 
with data starting in 1995 or 1996, and ending in Q2 2010. For some of the countries the data starts 
later (2000 for Bulgaria and Greece) whereas for Germany, France and Italy we can use longer 
series going back to 1990 (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). All details regarding the data used and 
transformations applied are available in Appendix A. 
4.  Results 
Before turning to the estimation results, we investigate the stationarity of the variables 
through panel unit root tests. As shown in Table 1, the variables in levels, which form the 
cointegrating relationship, have unit roots, whereas the log-differenced variables are stationary.  
 
Table 1. Results of panel unit root tests for the variables used 
Variables Series  tested
Levin, Lin
 & Chu t*
Im, Pesaran and
 Shin W-stat ADF-Fisher
HICP level -0.977 -0.107 33.472
log-dfference 7.31*** -8.45*** 151.07***
Wage level -2.12 -0.78 45.21
log-dfference -2.82*** -8.90*** 164.52***
URXC level -1.70** -7.37*** 133.92***
PVA level 2.54 1.28 29.53
NEER log-dfference -7.21*** -15.23*** 302.69***
level -6.19*** -3.35*** 79.13***  
Notes:  HICP refers to the HICP index, Wage to the nominal wage level, URXC to the cyclical component of 
unemployment, PVA to the productivity level, while NEER to the nominal effective exchange rate. The Levin, Lin and 
Chu t-test assumes common unit root process, whereas the remaining tests assume individual unit root processes. All tests 
in levels (with the exception of cyclical unemployment) include individual intercepts and trends. For unemployment, the 
test only includes intercept. 
 
                                                 
8 This also necessitates allowing contemporaneous inflation on the right-hand side in order to preserve the 
assumption of real wages.  16
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4.1. Baseline specification 
First, the baseline specification of the panel regression is presented in two versions: with 
and without the expected inflation variable (Specifications 3.1 and 3.1a in Table 3).  
In the pooled sample, the results suggest some evidence of real wage flexibility, based on 
the value of the unemployment coefficients Ȗ0 to Ȗ2, however part of the initial wage response is 
reversed in the long run due to hysteresis effects, as explained below. Economically, the magnitude 
of the estimated contemporaneous semi-elasticity would suggest that a 1 p.p. bigger gap between  
unemployment rate level and NAIRU is associated with approximately 1p.p.lower wage growth.  
The significant second unemployment lag with positive coefficient suggests the presence of 
unemployment persistence effects: after the initial effect of unemployment on wages there is a 
second, opposite effect, which (partly or in the case of hysteresis fully) reverses the initial reaction. 
This leads to lower longer-term real wage flexibility or a complete lack of response of wages in the 
case of hysteresis (see Gordon 1989, Moghadam and van Rijckeghem 1994).
9 Although persistence 
effects are usually diagnosed by a unit root in the unemployment rate (Leon-Ledesma and 
McAdam, 2004), alternatively a positive coefficient on lagged unemployment in the Phillips curve 
may also reflect a persistence effect (Layard et al. 2006, Feve et al., 2003). Unemployment 
persistence or hysteresis has been documented for many EU countries (e.g. Moghadam and 
Rijckeghem 1994 for Belgium, and Camarero et al. 2003 for Central and Eastern Europe) and 
insider effects have been identified as an important reason. After an adverse shock, the number of 
participants in the wage bargaining is reduced (e.g. laid off) and since insiders have a higher chance 
of keeping their jobs at any given wage, they generate an upward pressure on wages (Layard et al. 
2006; Blanchard and Summers, 1987). This in turn prolongs the effect of the unemployment shock.  
Turning to productivity growth as a second indicator of real wage flexibility, we observe 
certain evidence of wage flexibility as the first and second lag of the productivity variable have 
significant positive coefficients. This result refers to the short-run adjustment process, while the 
longer-run adjustment of real wages towards trend productivity captured by the long-run 
relationship. 
The coefficient of inflation implies that around 48% of growth in prices gets passed on to 
wage growth. In the specification with expected inflation (3.1a), the latter is significant and has a 
positive sign, indicating that it is a factor which matters in the wage determination process. Its 
inclusion increases the explanatory power of the regression and weakens somewhat the estimated 
relationship between wages and actual inflation. 
                                                 
9  Under full hysteresis, the coefficients of the contemporaneous and lagged unemployment are equal in 
absolute value, hence in the longer run no relationship exists between the unemployment level and wages, but 
only between unemployment and wage growth. In this case, wages are considered rigid. 17
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Real wages exhibit inertia, measured by a significant and positive coefficient of lagged 
wage growth up to the second lag. In total, about 34% of real wage growth is determined by its past 
values. 
Concerning the impact of the nominal effective exchange rate on wage growth, the 
coefficient of exchange rate depreciation is significant, but with a negative sign. A possible 
explanation of the negative coefficient might be the combination of long wage inertia and nominal 
wage rigidity that hampers the adjustment of nominal wages in the short run to exchange rate-
related price level changes. This in turn causes a decrease of real wages in the short run as a result 
of exchange rate depreciation. Indeed, the negative NEER coefficient appears in the first lag, i.e. 
concerns the real wage response within one quarter. A comparison across specifications reveals that 
the negative NEER coefficient is a quite robust result. 
Finally, the highly significant negative coefficient of the error correction term suggests that 
in the aggregate sample, wages have a strong tendency to return to their values determined by trend 
productivity and the price level. The long-term relationship between these three variables is 
presented in Table 2, imposing the restriction that the coefficient of the log price level is equal to 
one. 
Table 2. Cointegrating relationship between wages, prices and trend productivity 
 






Country fixed effects yes
Adj. R-squared 0.80
Panel unit root test (resid.) 55.59**
No. observations 1155  
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the wage level. The other variables are the logarithm of the price level 
(log(HICP)) and that of the productivity level ((log(PVA trend)). The test reported is the ADF-Fisher Chi-square panel 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2. Asymmetric response of wages with respect to the 
unemployment gap 
The differential response of wages to unemployment across the cycle is tested by 
allowing for different response depending on whether unemployment is below or above 
NAIRU (i.e. cyclical unemployment is positive or negative). The results (specification 3.2) 
suggest that a difference exists, and it mostly concerns the presence and size of persistence 
effects, as the contemporaneous coefficients in the two regimes are almost identical. When 
unemployment is below NAIRU, (i.e. during an upswing), the persistence term is not 
statistically significant and the coefficient (-0.004) is relatively large. In contrast, if 
unemployment is above NAIRU, (i.e. during a downturn) there is a clear hysteresis effect, 
which eliminates in two quarters most of the initial response of real wages to unemployment. 
This is in line with the findings of the literature (see Section 2.1.) 
Downward real wage rigidity is an explanation for this asymmetric behaviour: During 
downturns downward real wage rigidity becomes binding, whereas during upswings, even if 
present due to the institutional setup, it is not binding. Indeed, microeconomic studies on the 
EU countries present ample evidence on downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) in EU. It is 
usually related to the presence of institutional factors (e.g. indexation mechanisms), which do 
not allow real wages to adjust downwards (Babetskii at al, 2009). The microeconomic DRWR 
phenomenon is related to the cyclical response of wages. Messina et al. (2009) report a 
significant negative link between the extent of DRWR and the cyclicality of wages, defined as 
the response of wages to macroeconomic shocks. Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) investigate the 
wage response in individual countries and find evidence not only that their wage measure 
adjusts more when output is above potential, but also that cross-country heterogeneity is 
substantially higher in the down phase of the cycle.  
The size of the productivity coefficients also reveal differences in the productivity-
wage relationship across the regimes, however statistical tests do not reject the coefficients’ 
equality. There is indication that the response to productivity is the opposite compared to the 
response to unemployment: during downturns real wages adjust better to productivity changes 
than during upswings, when the link is much less clear. This could mean that adjustment to 
productivity works as an alternative adjustment channel when adjustment of real wages 










4.3. Differences between CEE countries and the euro area  
Another division criterion is between CEE countries, which joined the EU as a result of 
enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and the rest of the sample, called for brevity euro area
10. In 
principle, this division overlaps to a large extent with the grouping determined by labour market 
institutions: as shown in Section 2.2., the CEE EU members stand out along several 
euro area division might also capture factors beyond labour market institutions, like the fact that 
the CEE countries are characterized by faster productivity growth during the sample period.  
Specification 3.3 reveals different patterns across regimes both with respect to 
unemployment and to productivity, suggesting somewhat higher real wage flexibility in the 
CEE countries than in the euro area group. Regarding unemployment, like in the previous 
section, the difference is not in the contemporaneous term, but the first and second lags. In the 
case of the euro area group there is a fast reversal of the initial effect, which decreases 
substantially the cumulative degree of real wage flexibility in the longer run to a fraction of the 
initial value. For the CEE countries, the reversal is smaller in magnitude, and also takes more 
time to materialize. The F-test rejects equality of coefficients of the first lag of unemployment 
at the 10%, and for the second lag - at the 5% level.  
The more substantial difference between the two regimes is the one concerning the 
effects of productivity: the cumulative short-run coefficient in CEE countries is about 0.3 and 
very significant, whereas in the euro area there is no significant response. In fact, van Poeck 
(2007) also reports significantly bigger effect of productivity on wages in his CEE sample as 
compared to the euro area, which necessitates allowing for different slopes in the pooled data. 
The weaker link between productivity and real wage growth in this group might be also related 
to institutions and the degree to which they allow for adjustment of the real wage to 
productivity developments. 
  
4.4. The role of labour market institutions 
The basis for outlining the labour market institutions regimes is the hierarchical cluster 
analysis of Du Caju et al. (2008), which distinguishes three broad types of countries with 
respect to labour market institutions: broadly regulated, regulated and deregulated (See section 
2.2). It should be noted that this specification uses a shorter sample than the previous ones (it 
starts in 2000), as the cluster grouping in Du Caju et al. (2008) is based on the institutional 
                                                 
10  We include some current euro area countries in the CEE group  (Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia), 
since these countries have only joined the euro area towards the end of the sample period of our panel. 
institutional dimensions like dominant level of coordination and union density. However, the CEE-21
ECB




indicator values in 2008, and it is uncertain whether the clustering would be the same for the 
1990s, when many EU countries have undergone substantial reforms of their labour market 
institutions (e.g. Anspal and Vork, 2007).  
The results of specification 3.5 suggest that with respect to the response to 
unemployment, the least flexible group is the middle one with “broadly regulated” labour 
markets, since the immediate reversal of the initial response with equal coefficient points at 
substantial persistence effects. The regulated group also exhibits a hysteresis effect, but it does 
not eliminate all of the wage response. The deregulated economies seem to exhibit the largest 
degree of real wage flexibility – they have a large coefficient and no persistence term. The F 
test does not reject the equality of coefficients between the regulated and deregulated group, but 
rejects the equality of coefficients of each of these two with the middle group. Merging the 
regulated and de-regulated group and comparing it with the “broadly regulated” group gives a 
significant test statistic, suggesting that the middle group is indeed the one that stands out with 
the weakest degree of real wage flexibility.  
Explaining these differences requires investigating the components of the institutional 
clusters. (Du Caju et al. 2008). One dimension in which the three groups differ is the dominant 
level of bargaining. In the “broadly regulated” group, the sectoral level of bargaining is 
dominant in all but one of the countries, whereas in the deregulated group negotiations take 
place mostly on a company level. In the regulated group, with the exception of Belgium, 
negotiations take place mostly at the national or regional level
11. In this sense, the similarity 
between the regulated and deregulated groups, which are both more flexible than the middle 
group, is in line with the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis, which postulates a hump-shaped 
relationship between the level of coordination in the wage negotiations and the degree of real 
wage moderation.  
Turning to another institutional dimension – union density and coverage, it is notable 
that in the broadly regulated and regulated groups, all countries have high union coverage (only 
Germany has a middle level), whereas in the deregulated group union coverage is low to very 
low (with the exception of the Czech Republic, which has moved from a low to medium level). 
This might be a factor which explains partly the observed heterogeneity in wage flexibility, at 
least in the deregulated vs the middle group. High union coverage might also explain the high 
degree of unemployment persistence in the regulated and broadly regulated groups: higher 
coverage could give the union bigger bargaining power and hence cause a larger insider-caused 
persistence effect (see the persistence discussion in Section 4.1). 
                                                 
11 In Belgium, although the national level is also present, it is not dominant.  22
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The response of real wages to productivity developments shows a very different picture 
as compared to unemployment. Here unambiguously the largest response is in the deregulated 
countries (a cumulative coefficient of 0.6), followed by the middle group with a substantially 
lower coefficient – 0.09. In the regulated group no significant short-run response of wages to 
productivity can be identified. Hence, the response to productivity is the largest in those 
countries where the company level bargaining is dominant and the union coverage is low. The 
intuition could be that real wages are better aligned with productivity in the company setting, 
where company-level productivity is directly observable to both bargaining parties and wages 
are not bound by a union benchmark. In contrast, on a sectoral or national level the link might 
be less clear, as uniformly set wages would have to be aligned with the productivity growth in a 
heterogeneous group of industries.  
4.5. The role of the inflation level
The last issue considered is whether an inflation threshold exists, above which inflation 
can act as a factor that enhances real wage flexibility. We implement a search over a broad 
range of inflation values, allowing for different intercepts below and above the threshold. As 
optimal specification we choose the one, which maximizes the adjusted R-square and at the 
same time shows significant difference in the slope coefficients below and above the threshold. 
The inflation value that corresponds to this specification is equal to 0.014 in logarithmic terms, 
or around 5.6% in terms of annual inflation. 
The contemporaneous coefficient of unemployment above the threshold is significantly 
larger (in absolute value) than the one below (see specification 3.4 in Table 3). The cumulative 
wage response is also stronger, as the size of the lagged coefficient below the threshold hints at 
full hysteresis. Our result is in line with the findings reported in section 2.1, explaining the 
differential response to inflation through the presence of nominal downward wage rigidity. In 
turn, the degree of nominal downward wage rigidity is related to the existing labour market 
institutions: Holden and Wulfsberg (2007) find that downward nominal wage rigidity is larger 
in countries with higher union density and better labour protection, as workers whose wage is 
set by unions have better protection against a nominal wage cut. Employment protection 
legislation is key to protecting non-unionized workers from wage cuts (Holden and Wulfsberg 
2007). 
Concerning the response to productivity, the results do not reveal significant 
differences between the two regimes. 
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          Poolability is an important consideration in any panel strategy.  In our paper poolability is 
tested by applying the Roy-Zellner-Baltagi (RZB) test (Baltagi, 2008), in combination with the 
modified critical values reported by Bun (2004)
12. All tests are performed with respect to 
several groups of variables similarly to Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007): for unemployment only, 
productivity only; unemployment and productivity jointly and then jointly for all exogenous 
slopes, without the intercepts (see Table 4). In the baseline specification (Specification 3.1 in 
Table 3), although poolability is not rejected by the less restrictive threshold value for dynamic 
panels with non-spherical disturbances, it is rejected by the stricter version which also takes 
into account serial correlation.  
Table 4. Poolability results 
Poolability - null hypothesis Test statistic
H0: All exog. slopes are poolable 3.99
H0: URX and PVA slopes are poolable 3.58
H0: URX is poolable 3.44
H0: PVA is poolable 3.42
Dynamic panel, non-spheric disturbances 2.6
Dynamic panel, non-spheric disturbances, serial 
correlation 5.4
5% critical values by Bun
 
Note: The unrestricted model used for calculation of test statistics is with varying slopes of the 
unemployment (URX), productivity (PVA), inflation  (HICP) and NEER variables. 
          
An issue to which we return after having considered all specifications is how the 
poolability test results change after controlling for heterogeneity across different groups. In 
most specifications, except the one including labour market institutions, the poolability test 
statistics point at modest improvements and the results are rather similar to the baseline 
specification. The specification with labour market institutions however marks a very 
substantial improvement: the test statistics is very close to the stringent threshold value, which 
takes into account the dynamic panel, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The poolability 
test statistic provides a value of 2.62, comparable with Bun’s threshold value of 2.60 in Table 1. 
We can conclude that for this specific sample, labour market institutions capture a substantial 




                                                 
12 Bun (2004) has demonstrated that the asymptotic RZB test statistics are biased for finite samples of 
macroeconomic panels with relatively large T as compared to N and the non-corrected asymptotic test 
would tend to always reject the null, especially in dynamic panels and with serial correlation. 24
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4.7. Robustness across time 
Our robustness check suggests that the patterns of adjustment of wage growth to 
unemployment and productivity remain very similar if we consider a shorter sample. In order to 
investigate the degree of homogeneity of the estimated coefficients over time, all regressions 
from Table 3 (with exception of the institutional specification), are re-estimated with a shorter 
sample starting in q1 2000 (Table 5). In general, the results are similar (i.e. with respect to the 
sign, significance and size of coefficients), however there are several slight differences between 
the two samples.  










NEER (-1) -0.065** -0.078**
(0.029) (0.034)
NEER (-2) 0.017** 0.034
(0.032) (0.036)
WAGE (-1) 0.123*** 0.133***
(0.036) (0.040)
WAGE (-2) 0.217*** 0.196***
(0.037) (0.039)






 NAIRU CEE non-CEE high infl. low infl. 
URXC -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
URXC(-1) 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003 0 0.004*** 0 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
URXC(-2) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.003** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Productivity
PVA (-1) 0.111*** 0.087** 0.169*** 0.076 0.222*** 0.081** 0.156** 0.115***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.056) (0.048) (0.075) (0.039) (0.073) (0.042)
PVA (-2) 0.016 0 -0.005 0.083 0.168** -0.086 -0.054 -0.005
(0.036) (0.042) (0.045) (0.063) (0.064) (0.049) (0.075) (0.042)
Expected inflation 0.001***
(0.000)
Countryf ixed effects yes yes
R-squared 0.43 0.42
Adj. R-squared 0.41 0.40
No. observations 791 686
One, two and three asterisks denote significance correspondingly at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. 










































































The major difference is that with the shorter sample, the determinants considered explain 
a larger part of the variation in wage growth (the R-squared is higher). Second, the adjustment 
appears to happen faster: the effect which was earlier spread over two quarters now is captured 
within one quarter and the second lags are rarely significant – this applies to unemployment, 
productivity, exchange rate and inflation. The higher coefficient of the error correction term 
(which almost doubled in most cases) also indicates a faster adjustment towards long-term 
equilibrium. Finally, in the specification with business cycle heterogeneity, the response of wages 
to unemployment appears to be more equal across regimes – the differences in the unemployment 
coefficients are no longer significant. 
5. Conclusions
 
The key objective of our paper was to measure the degree of real wage flexibility in EU 
countries and to determine how it varies depending on country characteristics such as labour 
market institution.  
Our baseline specification finds evidence of a negative and significant response of wage 
growth to contemporary cyclical unemployment. However, we also find that part of the initial 
wage response is reversed in a few quarters due to hysteresis effects. Turning to an alternative 
indicator of real wage flexibility, some evidence of flexibility has also been detected with respect 
  One of our alternative specifications reveals a differential response of wages to 
unemployment across the cycle, which is a result largely in line with the literature. When 
unemployment is below NAIRU (i.e. during an upswing in the business cycle), the persistence 
term is not significant and real wage flexibility is relatively high. In contrast, if unemployment is 
above NAIRU (i.e. during a downturn when real wage flexibility is the most needed) there is a 
clear hysteresis effect, which eliminates in two quarters most of the initial response of real wages 
to unemployment.  
 Real wage flexibility appears to be somewhat higher in the CEE countries than in the 
euro area both with respect to unemployment and to productivity. This difference is likely related 
to differences in labour market institutions. 
Looking in more detail at the role of institutional differences on real wage flexibility we 
apply the hierarchical cluster analysis of Du Caju et al. (2008) distinguishing three broad types of 
countries with respect to labour market institutions: broadly regulated, regulated and deregulated. 
With respect to unemployment, the least flexible group is the middle one with “broadly 
regulated” labour markets, since the immediate reversal of the initial response with equal 
coefficient points at substantial hysteresis effects. The regulated group also exhibits a hysteresis 
to productivity growth. 26
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effect, although it does not eliminate all of the wage response. The deregulated economies seem 
to exhibit the largest degree of real wage flexibility. The similarity between the regulated and 
deregulated groups, which are both more flexible than the middle group, is in line with the 
Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis which postulates a hump-shaped relationship between the level of 
coordination in the wage negotiations and the degree of real wage moderation. The picture is 
somewhat different as regards the response of real wages to productivity growth. The response to 
productivity is clearly largest in the deregulated group, where company level bargaining is 
dominant. The second largest impact is in the middle, broadly regulated group with a 
substantially lower coefficient.  
Finally our panel data analysis reveals that an inflation threshold may exist, below which 
low inflation may decrease real wage flexibility. The differential response of real wage flexibility 
to inflation seems to confirm the evidence on the presence of nominal downward wage rigidity in 
the EU countries.  
Overall our results suggest that labour market adjustment mechanisms in the EU 
countries might be impaired in particular in downturns and during low inflation periods. This 
implies that in the euro area countries and also in those CEE countries outside the euro area that 
successfully enter a low inflation period in their convergence process have to pay particular 
attention that their policies do not hamper real wage flexibility (e.g. by avoiding excessive 
minimum wage or public sector pay increases). As regards the role of wage bargaining 
institutions, our results do not suggest that the way to go forward is necessarily to move towards 
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Appendix A: Data definitions and sources 
Wage growth (dl_WAGE) is calculated as logarithmic quarter-on-quarter difference of the 
seasonally adjusted nominal average wage for the total economy. The raw data for this 
indicator is taken from ESA. Wages in national currency are converted to euro using the 
monthly average of the bilateral exchange rate. 
 
Inflation (dl_HIC) is the logarithmic quarter-on-quarter difference of the level of the 
seasonally adjusted HICP index, reported by ESA.  
 
Productivity (PVAE) is expressed as the real value added in constant 2000 prices, divided by 
total employment, where both series stem from ESA. Only in Greece, the nominal value added 
is divided by the HICP index in order to obtain a real figure, due to a lack of a suitable real 
value added series. Productivity is seasonally adjusted and converted into euro using the value 
of the exchange rate in January 2000. Productivity growth (dl_PVAE) is obtained as the 
quarter-on-quarter logarithmic change of the productivity series. Trend productivity, which is 
used in the cointegrating relationship, is obtained by applying Hodrick-Prescott filter to the 
productivity series. 
 
For cyclical unemployment (URXC), we use as a basis the unemployment rate, but from 
slightly different sources for CEE countries and the euro area. For CEE countries we follow the 
LFS definition and obtain the unemployment rate through dividing the LFS number of 
unemployed persons aged 15 and above by the LFS economically active population in the same 
age range. For some countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania) the series are 
extended backwards with earlier data from the ILO Laborsta database, which also follows the 
LFS definition. For the euro area, we use the standardized unemployment rate from the ESA 
short-run statistics database, as for these countries the LFS unemployment rate is rarely 
available at quarterly frequency before 2000. Unemployment is seasonally adjusted and used in 
levels. For cyclical unemployment, an estimate for NAIRU is constructed through applying a 
Hodrick – Prescott filter to the original unemployment series, which is then subtracted from the 
unemployment series.  
 
Expected inflation (exp_infl) is calculated using a quantification of the EC surveys on 
inflation perceptions and expectations. The theoretical basis for this quantification is the 
methodology developed by Forsells and Kenny (2002) for the euro area. As input data, it uses 
the series of responses to the questions regarding perceived inflation the last 12 months and 31
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expected price developments over the next 12 months. The survey data is available for all 
countries except Germany and Bulgaria, but for some countries the series is rather short (for 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the data only starts in 2001). 
 
Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is taken from Haver Analytics and the national 
banks of the countries.  
 
Table A1. Data availability: Start dates of the main time series for EU 
countries
Country URX PVA HICP WAGE Exp. Infl
Bulgaria q1 2000 q1 2000 q4 1996 q3 1999 -
Czech republic q1 1994 q1 1995 q1 1995 q1 1995 q1 1995
Estonia q1 1997 q1 1993 q1 1995 q3 1993 q2 1993
Latvia q2 1996 q1 1993 q1 1995 q1 1995 q1 1993
Lithuania q1 1998 q1 1995 q1 1995 q1 1995 q2 2001
Hungary q1 1995 q1 1995 q1 1996 q1 1993 q1 1993
Poland q1 1994 q1 1995 q1 1996 q1 1995 q2 2001
Romania q1 1996 q1 1998 q1 1995 q1 1993 q2 2001
Slovenia  q1 1996 q1 1995 q1 1995 q1 1993 q1 1996
Slovakia q1 1994 q1 1994 q1 1995 q1 1995 q2 1999
Germany q1 1990 q1 1991 q1 1990 q1 1991 -
Spain q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1992 q1 1990 q1 1990
France q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1990
Italy q1 1998 q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1990
Austria q1 1993 q1 1995 q1 1990 q1 1990 q4 1995
Greece q2 1998 q1 2000 q1 1990 q1 2000 q1 1990
Ireland q2 1990 q1 1998 q1 1990 q1 1998 q1 1990
Belgium q1 1990 q1 1995 q1 1991 q1 1995 q1 1990
Netherlands q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1990 q1 1995 q1 1990  32
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Table A2. Level of collective bargaining, collective bargaining coverage and union 
density in the CEE countries 
Country
Main level of 
Bargaining Collective Bargaining coverage Union Density
Bulgaria  Company  Very low  Very low 
Czech R.  Sectoral  Low  Low 
Estonia  Company  Low  Very low 
Hungary  Company  Low  Very low 
Latvia  Company  Very low  Very low 
Lithuania  Company  Very low   
Poland  Company  Low  Very low 
Romania  Company/National  -  - 
Slovakia  Sectoral  Low  Very low 
Slovenia  National/Sectoral  High  High 
Source: Eurosystem's Wage Dynamics Network Questionnaire (2006), ECB Ocassional Paper 61. “Determinants Of 
Growth in the Central and Eastern European EU Member States - A Production Function approach” 
Notes: The values in the dark cells refer to the year 2003, while the rest of the information refers to 2006. 
Very Low: 0-25%; Low: 26-50%; Medium: 51-75%; High:76%-100% 
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